In this new kind of introduction to ethical theory, Daniel Muñoz and Sarah Stroud present 50 of the field's most exciting puzzles, paradoxes, and thought experiments. Over the course of 11 chapters, the authors cover a huge variety of topics, starting with the classic debate between utilitarians and deontologists and ending on existential questions about the future of humanity. Every chapter begins with a helpful introduction, and each of the 50 entries includes references for further reading and questions (...) for reflection. Among the entries are such classics as the Ring of Gyges, Jim and the Villagers, the Repugnant Conclusion, JoJo, "One Thought Too Many," the Miners Puzzle, the Gentle Murder Paradox, Nowheresville, the Experience Machine, and the Trolley Problem. The book also explores several more recent topics of interest, such as doxastic wronging and the ethics of AI, so that even advanced students are likely to discover something new. Each entry can be read on its own, and the writing is accessible and conversational throughout, making this an ideal resource for undergraduate teaching. Readers at any level can pick up this book and see for themselves how fascinating-and puzzling-ethical theory can be. (shrink)

Supererogatory acts—good deeds “beyond the call of duty”—are a part of moral common sense, but conceptually puzzling. I propose a unified solution to three of the most infamous puzzles: the classic Paradox of Supererogation (if it’s so good, why isn’t it just obligatory?), Horton’s All or Nothing Problem, and Kamm’s Intransitivity Paradox. I conclude that supererogation makes sense if, and only if, the grounds of rightness are multi-dimensional and comparative.

Philosophers have long argued that duties to oneself are paradoxical, as they seem to entail an incoherent power to release oneself from obligations. I argue that self-release is possible, both as a matter of deontic logic and of metaethics.

Deontologists believe in two key exceptions to the duty to promote the good: restrictions forbid us from harming others, and prerogatives permit us not to harm ourselves. How are restrictions and prerogatives related? A promising answer is that they share a source in rights. I argue that prerogatives cannot be grounded in familiar kinds of rights, only in something much stranger: waivable rights against oneself.

Consequentialists say we may always promote the good. Deontologists object: not if that means killing one to save five. “Consequentializers” reply: this act is wrong, but it is not for the best, since killing is worse than letting die. I argue that this reply undercuts the “compellingness” of consequentialism, which comes from an outcome-based view of action that collapses the distinction between killing and letting die.

Contingent negative existentials give rise to a notorious paradox. I formulate a version in terms of metaphysical grounding: nonexistence can't be fundamental, but nothing can ground it. I then argue for a new kind of solution, expanding on work by Kit Fine. The key idea is that negative existentials are contingently zero-grounded – that is to say, they are grounded, but not by anything, and only in the right conditions. If this is correct, it follows that grounding cannot be an (...) internal relation, and that no complete account of reality can be purely fundamental. (shrink)

In the classic Miners case, an agent subjectively ought to do what they know is objectively wrong. This case shows that the subjective and objective ‘oughts’ are somewhat independent. But there remains a powerful intuition that the guidance of objective ‘oughts’ is more authoritative—so long as we know what they tell us. We argue that this intuition must be given up in light of a monotonicity principle, which undercuts the rationale for saying that objective ‘oughts’ are an authoritative guide for (...) agents and advisors. (shrink)

When, if ever, do we wrong ourselves? The Self-Other Symmetric answer is: when we do to ourselves what would wrong a consenting other. The standard objection, which has gone unchallenged for decades, is that Symmetry seems to imply that we wrong ourselves in too many cases—where rights are unwaivable, or “self-consent” is lacking. We argue that Symmetry not only survives these would-be counterexamples; it explains and unifies them. The key to Symmetry is not, as critics have supposed, the bizarre claim (...) that we must literally give ourselves consent if we are to avoid wronging ourselves. Instead, it is that we authorize ourselves simply by making decisions, just as we can authorize others by making decisions jointly. (shrink)

Supererogatory acts are those that lie “beyond the call of duty.” There are two standard ways to define this idea more precisely. Although the definitions are often seen as equivalent, I argue that they can diverge when options are infinite, or when there are cycles of better options; moreover, each definition is acceptable in only one case. I consider two ways out of this dilemma.

After 50 years of debate, the ethics of aggregation has reached a curious stalemate, with both sides arguing that only their theory treats people as equals. I argue that, on the issue of equality, both sides are wrong. From the premise that “each counts for one,” we cannot derive the conclusion that “more count for more” or its negation. The familiar arguments from equality to aggregation presuppose more than equality: the Kamm/Scanlon “Balancing Argument” rests on what social choice theorists call (...) “(Positive) Responsiveness,” Kamm’s “Aggregation Argument” assumes that “equal” lives are fungible, and Hsieh et al. have it that spreading goods broadly best approximates equality. In each case, the crucial premise is not equality itself but a further idea that Taurek, I argue, can safely reject. I conclude with a conjecture: there is no theory-neutral argument that settles the question of whether the numbers count. (shrink)

There are plenty of classic paradoxes about conditional obligations, like the duty to be gentle if one is to murder, and about “supererogatory” deeds beyond the call of duty. But little has been said about the intersection of these topics. We develop the first general account of conditional supererogation, with the power to solve familiar puzzles as well as several that we introduce. Our account, moreover, flows from two familiar ideas: that conditionals restrict quantification and that supererogation emerges from a (...) clash between justifying and requiring reasons. (shrink)

Moral philosophy is often said to be about what we owe to each other. Do we owe anything to ourselves?

John Taurek argues that, in a choice between saving the many or the few, the numbers should not count. Some object that this view clashes with the transitivity of ‘better than’; others insist the clash can be avoided. I defend a middle ground: Taurek cannot have transitivity, but that doesn’t doom his view, given a suitable conception of value. I then formalize and explore two conceptions: one context-sensitive, one multidimensional.

Why should ‘better than’ be transitive? The leading answer in ethics is that values do not change with context. But this cannot be the entire source of transitivity, I argue, since transitivity can fail even if values never change, so long as they are complex, with multiple dimensions combined non-additively. I conclude by exploring a new hypothesis: that all alleged cases of nontransitive betterness, such as Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion, can and should be modelled as the result of complexity, not context-relativity.

Justification depends on context: even if E on its own justifies H, still it might fail to justify in the context of D. This sort of effect, epistemologists think, is due to defeaters, which undermine or rebut a would-be justifier. I argue that there is another fundamental sort of contextual feature, disqualification, which doesn't involve rebuttal or undercutting, and which cannot be reduced to any notion of screening-off. A disqualifier makes some would-be justifier otiose, as direct testimony sometimes does to (...) distal testimony, and as manifestly decisive evidence might do to gratuitous evidence on the same team. Basing a belief on disqualified evidence, moreover, is distinctively irrational. One is not necessarily irresponsible. Instead one is turning down a free upgrade to a sleeker, stabler basis for one's beliefs. Such an upgrade would prevent wastes of epistemic effort, since someone who bases her belief on a disqualified proposition E will need to remember E and rethink her belief should E ever be defeated. The upgrade might also reduce reliance on unwieldy evidence, if E is relevant only thanks to some labyrinthine argument; and if even ideal agents should doubt their ability to follow such arguments, even they should care about disqualifiers. (shrink)

Morality doesn't always require our best. Prudent acts and heroic sacrifices are optional, not obligatory. To explain this, some philosophers claim that reasons of self-interest must have a special "non-moral" significance. A better explanation, I argue, is that we have prerogatives based in rights.

According to a familiar (alleged) requirement on practical reason, one must believe a proposition if one is to take it for granted in reasoning about what to do. This paper explores a related requirement, not on thinking but on acting—that one must accept a goal if one is to count as acting for its sake. This is the acceptance requirement. Although it is endorsed by writers as diverse as Christine Korsgaard, Donald Davidson, and Talbot Brewer, I argue that it is (...) vulnerable to counterexamples, in which agents act in light of ends that they do not accept but are still merely considering. For instance, a young professional may keep a job option open not because she definitely wants or intends to take it, but just because she is considering taking it. I try to show that such examples are not easily resisted; that they present challenges specifically for Brewer, Davidson, and especially Korsgaard; and that the examples also raise fresh, non-partisan questions in action theory. What is considering, exactly? How could it fall short of acceptance while still guiding behaviour? How can we act for an end before thinking it through? (shrink)

So you want to publish some philosophy—preferably, good philosophy in a nice journal. -/- How do you do it?

This is just an initial draft, which I hope to work on over the next year in light of comments. If you think I left off a big question, or left on a boring one, please email me! (Thanks to Brian Hedden and Harvey Lederman for some initial comments.).

Value pluralists believe in multiple dimensions of value. What does betterness along a dimension have to do with being better overall? Any systematic answer begins with the Strong Pareto principle: one thing is overall better than another if it is better along one dimension and at least as good along all others. We defend Strong Pareto from recent counterexamples and use our discussion to develop a novel view of dimensions of value, one which puts Strong Pareto on firmer footing. We (...) conclude by defending Dimensionalism, the hypothesis that overall value relations are determined solely by how things compare along value dimensions. These are first steps towards a more systematic value pluralism. (shrink)

La importancia que tiene el relato de la creación del mundo (Gen 1-2) para judíos, cristianos y musulmanes, se refleja en diferentes manifestaciones artísticas medievales. Este artículo analiza algunas de las representaciones a que dio lugar dicho relato, y al uso diverso del lenguaje artístico –figurativo y no figurativo– a que recurrieron los artistas. La segunda parte del artículo se centra en el examen de la Sinagoga del Tránsito de Toledo y propone, a través del estudio conjunto de decoración y (...) epigrafía, y de algunos referentes culturales judíos, una interpretación que descubre en sus muros una representación no figurativa y simbólica del capítulo primero del Génesis. (shrink)

How could it be wrong to exploit—say, by paying sweatshop wages—if the exploited party benefits? How could it be wrong to do something gratuitously bad—like giving to a wasteful charity—if that is better than permissibly doing nothing? Joe Horton argues that these puzzles, known as the Exploitation Problem and All or Nothing Problem, have no unified answer. I propose one and pose a challenge for Horton’s take on the Exploitation Problem.

Some sacrifices—like giving a kidney or heroically dashing into a burning building—are supererogatory: they are good deeds beyond the call of duty. But if such deeds are really so good, philosophers ask, why shouldn’t morality just require them? The standard answer is that morality recognizes a special role for the pursuit of self-interest, so that everyone may treat themselves as if they were uniquely important. This idea, however, cannot be reconciled with the compelling picture of morality as impartial—the view that (...) we are each anyone’s equal. I propose an alternative Self-Other Symmetric account of our moral freedom: the limits on what morality may demand of us are set by the duties we owe to ourselves. I begin with a defense of the Self-Other Symmetry: the idea that we owe the same duties to ourselves—and have the same rights against ourselves—as any relevantly similar other. Because we are consenting parties to our own actions, I argue, our rights against ourselves do not function like the rights of unwilling others. Instead, they play a permissive function, allowing us to block the demand to give up what is ours. I conclude by uniting, aggravating, and trying to solve some paradoxes of supererogatory permissions, guided by the idea that morality cannot be reduced to a ranking of options from best-to-worst. Rights against oneself are an irreducible second dimension, one that we need if we are to unify rights and supererogation into an impartial moral vision. (shrink)

We study randomizations of definable groups. Whenever the underlying theory is stable or NIP and the group is definably amenable, we show its randomization is definably connected.

Este artículo discute los aportes de Quentin Skinner al análisis de las imágenes en la retórica política del Renacimiento y explora una elucidación teórica sobre su funcionamiento argumentativo aplicando la teoría de los actos de las imágenes de Horst Bredekamp. Después de revisar las dimensiones de la retórica de Skinner, el trabajo se enfoca en el examen del lugar que ocupan las imágenes en los argumentos retóricos. Para esto discute algunas imágenes icónicas del Renacimiento italiano e inglés como el Fresco (...) de Siena de Lorenzetti y el frontispicio del “Leviatán” de Hobbes. El trabajo establece que, a lo menos, tres figuras retóricas renacentistas que elaboraban imágenes con fines persuasivos servían de manera eficaz para construir abstracciones políticas, ficciones y para modificar significados de conceptos políticos. En términos visuales, el funcionamiento de estas tres figuras discursivas encuentra una explicación en la teoría de los de las imágenes que Bredekamp. El artículo concluye que, si bien la vinculación de los conceptos retóricos y visuales de ambos autores puede ser ejemplificada con el análisis de una sección del frontispicio del “Leviatán”, la viabilidad de utilizar este ensamblaje como modelo teórico para el examen de otras imágenes renacentistas depende, entre otras consideraciones, de la posibilidad de asociarlas a textos, contextos y a la comprensión de la recepción de los argumentos en una discusión específica. (shrink)

We know what to say about the agent who knowingly does the wrong thing. But what of the wrongdoer who doesn't know everything that matters? Some of the usual criticisms may apply, if some of the usual mistakes were made. Other usual criticisms will miss the mark. One task for moral theory is to explain this variety of censures and failures. Derek Parfit proposes that we define for each criticism a sense of 'wrong', and that each new sense be defined (...) in terms of the 'ordinary' sense. The authors argue in favor of another approach, inspired by Parfit's earlier work, requiring only one sense of 'wrong'. They conclude by showing that their own approach is also deeply flawed—that neither theory can explain the many ways to do wrong in ignorance of what matters. This is not a conclusion with which moral theorists should be happy. (shrink)

Coleman Hughes argues for a "colorblind" approach to morality and policy: we should try to treat people without regard to race. I argue that colorblindness is less feasible, and less desirable, than it sounds. Hughes conceives of race as being skin-deep, not the sort of thing one should care about. But in American politics, "races" are often really ethnic groups, defined by a shared culture and history -- two things that we might reasonably care about. A colorblind ethos asks ethnic (...) minorities not to be partial towards their group and to instead join in the "melting pot." Understandably, not everyone will want to do this, and the result is both a moral and practical challenge for colorblind politics. (Currently rewriting this to submit to the Journal of American Affairs; comments welcome.). (shrink)

We argue that supererogation cannot be understood just in terms of reasons for action. In addition to reasons, a theory of supererogation must include prerogatives, which can make an action permissible without counting in favor of doing it.

This article explores the philosophy of Alain Badiou from the vantage point of the concepts of the localization, delocalization, and relocalization of the void as thematized through literary arts, religion, emancipatory politics, and the subject of psychoanalysis. In short, these moments around the void characterize the processes through which truth is processed and seen through their full realization by a philosophical engagement across the various conditions in which these truths occur. The localization of a void is the naming of an (...) indiscernible element that is incommensurable to the rubric of constructible knowledge, sense and meaning which could saturate the space of truth. Thus, the naming that localizes the void acts as a subtraction of the invariant in the variance of situation such that across various points in space and time, we are still able to subtract the universal as the invariant not just as the fidelity to the localized truth but also as the resurrection of truth upon its relocalization at a different place and a different time. At its core, this article is concerned with truth, why truth is persistent, and why we have to struggle to articulate the truth that we are trying to be faithful to again and again with each instance that truth risks being covered-over and obscured. (shrink)

The COVID‐19 pandemic triggered an unprecedented health crisis that impacted healthcare systems worldwide. This study explores how Spanish healthcare workers learned, internalised and integrated values and work behaviours during the COVID‐19 pandemic and their impact on the personal sphere. This documentary research, using images, narratives and audiovisual content, was framed within the interpretative hermeneutic paradigm. Categories and subcategories emerged after a final theoretical sampling that focused on the analysis. Data triangulation between researchers favoured theoretical saturation. A total of 117 images (...) and 27 texts were selected. The analysis identified three stages: bewilderment, seeking functionality in the chaos and integrating chaos into care. The data reflects how the need for security and knowledge, and the exhaustion and frustration caused by the initial working conditions, prompted adaptive responses. These responses involved focusing on problem‐solving and strengthening group sentiments and solidarity. Subsequently, the data indicates the acceptance of new structural, organisational and communication aspects. The findings of the analysis will contribute towards finding a framework that can help understand community health crisis events. (shrink)

What are the grounds for the distinction between the mental and the physical? What is it the relation between ascribing mental states to an organism and understanding its behavior? Are animals and complex systems vehicles of inner evolutionary environments? Is there a difference between personal and sub-personal level processes in the brain? Answers to these and other questions were developed in Daniel Dennett’s first book, Content and Consciousness (1969), where he sketched a unified theoretical framework for views that are (...) now considered foundational in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. -/- Content and Consciousness Revisited is devoted to reconsider the ideas and ideals introduced in Dennett’s seminal book, by covering its fundamental concepts, hypotheses and approaches, and taking into account the findings and progress which have taken place during more than four decades. This book includes original and critical contributions about the relations between science and philosophy, the personal/sub-personal level distinction, intelligence, learning, intentionality, rationality, propositional attitudes, among other issues of scientific and philosophical interest. Each chapter embraces an updated approach to several disciplines, like cognitive science, cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive psychiatry. (shrink)

Libro reseñado: Dulces sueños. Obstáculos filosóficos para una ciencia de la conciencia. Autor: Daniel Dennett.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Theory ofMotivation — Part 2 Daniel Shaw Introduction and Summary of Part 1 In an earlier paper of the same title1 1 defended a Humean theory of motivation against rationalist views ofB. Stroud and T. Nagel.2 In this paper I shouldlike to relate my theory tomore recent writings, explain its implications for the topic ofmoral motivation and provide further support for the main argument ofmy original (...) paper. To begin with, a summary of my previous discussion: while two critics of Hume's theory, B. Stroud and T. Nagel, disagree about the role ofreason inaction(Stroudaccepts, Nagelrejectsthe Humeanclaim thatreason alone can never produce action) theyboth agree inrejecting Hume's view thatmotivating desire essentially involves feelings which are identifiable by the agent, in his conscious experience, by introspection, as something extra, something over and above any purely rational considerations he may have for taking action. As an alternative to this Humean, experiential view ofmotivating desire, Stroud argues that the concept of motivating desire should be analysednotinterms ofanyintrinsic propertyknowablein experience, butratherin terms ofits function in leading, along withbelief, to action. In Stroud's words: "It might well be that to have a desire for or a propensity towards E is simply to be in a state such that when you come to believe that a certain action will lead to E you are moved to perform that action."3 In a similar spirit4 Nagel claims, contrary to Hume, that there do exist at least some cases (for example, actions motivated by a person's prudential consideration of his own future interests) in which reason alone—that is, the agent's grasp of certain purely rational considerations—is all that motivates action. In the context of these purely rationally motivated actions, Nagel argues, our talk of desire does not refef to anyadditional inclination towards, or preferences for, or sentiment about some goal that we have, but is either just another way of saying that the act is motivated, that is, that we are in some state which disposes us to do whatever we think will lead to a certain result, or else indicates some structural feature ofthe reasoningbehind our behaviour; for example, indicates the fact that in view of purely rational considerations which confront us, it would be irrational of us not to perform the act in question. Volume XVII Number 2 19 DANIEL SHAW Against any such account ofmotivating desire which denies the necessity of the experiential component (that is, of Hume's introspectible sentiment), I argued that all such accounts have a false implication. They all falsely imply that some purely rational consideration, a bare behef, could, all on its own (unaccompanied by any actual or potential pro- or con-attitude), motivate a purposive action. With the help ofa counter-example I argued5 that although it is logically possible for bare beliefs of that kind to produce overt behaviour, such pure rationalist 'action' never in fact happens; and, more importantly, ifwe carefully consider what such 'action' would be like ifit didhappen, we findit would not count as voluntary, purposive action, in the fullest sense. So Hume, I concluded, was right to maintain that motivating desire essentially involves introspectible feehngs. However, the standard interpretation of Hume's view about the relation between desires and feelings yields an indefensible theory of motivated action. On the standard reading, desires simply are feehngs, and the Humean is left with no adequate reply to the obvious objection that, often enough, for example, when acting after calm deliberation, or when performing routine habit-actions, we are not aware of the occurrence of any such feehng immediately prior to or at the time of action. Hume tells us that in all such cases there is—in addition to the operation of reason—a calm passion present—a passion so calm as to be readily confused with and mistaken for the determinations of reason. But on the standard reading of 'calm passions' as very faint or imperceptible feelings, this is a lame argument. As Stroud points out,6 not only is there no independent justification for the claim that in all such cases there always are such faint or imperceptible feehngs,7 but also that claim is inconsistent... (shrink)

In this paper I try to defend McDowell’s empiricism from a certain objection made by Davidson, Stroud and Glüer. The objection states that experiences cannot be reasons because they are—as McDowell conceives them—inert. I argue that, even though there is something correct in the objection, that is not sufficient for rejecting the epistemological character that McDowell attributes to experiences. My strategy consists basically in showing that experiences involve a constitutive attitude of acceptance of their contents.

Presento la trascendencia de la neurociencia para el estudio de la relación entre determinismo y libre albedrío. Diversos trabajos vinculan la actividad de ciertas áreas nerviosas con el desempeño de las funciones volitivas, el trabajo de Benjamin Libet y de Daniel Wegner otorga gran importancia al inconsciente en nuestros actos, y hay pruebas de influencia causal del entorno sociocultural sobre el cerebro del individuo. Todo esto sugiere una concepción determinista de nuestra voluntad, pero sostengo que ni esta ni la (...) indeterminista están claras actualmente y que se debe profundizar en la neuroplasticidad, las decisiones distales y la deliberación. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Moral Sentimentalism Daniel Shaw In chapter 7 ofhis book, Hume, Barry Stroud considers and rejects a number of standard interpretations of Hume's sentimentalism and then argues for his own 'projectionist' interpretation.1 In this paper I shall commentbriefly on all thesereadings, raise objectionsto Stroud's proposal, and, finally, argue in favour of what I shall call the 'power* interpretation ofHume's sentimentalism. Hume maintains that the vice or (...) virtue ofan action is not a matter offact about the action that can be inferred from anything, by causal orinductive reasoningalone, nor afact that canbe discovered by direct perception ofan action, but that, rather, vice and virtue are matters of moral sentiment. Hume writes, Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see ifyou can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, voUtions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but thatfrom the constitution ofyour nature youhave a feeling or sentiment ofblame from the contemplation of it. Vice andvirtue, therefore, maybe compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not quaUties in objects, but perceptions in the mind.2 Stroud gives the following explanation ofthis passage: [W]hat we believe or 'pronounce' when we regard an action as vicious is different from and more than anything we can discover by perception of the action or by inference from its observed characteristics to other matters of fact about it. Hume grants that there are certain observable characteristics an action can be known to possess such that when we know Volume XIX Number 1 31 DANIEL SHAW that the action has them we inevitably regard it as vicious. (H 178) In a case of wilful murder, for example, we can discover by (roughly) causal reasoning that one man deliberately and unnecessarily destroyed a human life, and caused great suffering, pain and hardship both to the victim and to others. (H 177) And Hume would grant that when we know that the man's action has these characteristics we inevitably regard it as vicious. But, he quiterightlyinsists that that does notimply thatregarding that action as vicious is simply believing that it has those observable [and inferrable] characteristics. He thinks that pronouncing an action to be vicious is something different and that is why he says that the vice entirely escapes you as long as you consider only the object thought to be vicious. (H 178) Why does Hume think that, for example, believing an act of wilful murder to be vicious cannot consist simply and entirely in beUeving it to possess the observable and inferrable characteristics of being a deliberate and unnecessary destruction of human life which caused great suffering, pain, etc.? Surely, one might think, to believe all that ofan action is all there need be for believing the action to be a morally vicious action. But, of course, Hume would argue that since the above beliefis itselfmerely a conclusion ofperception and causal reasoning, which in itself has no motivating power, and since, by contrast, the judgement that the act is morally vicious, being a moral judgement, must in itselfbe capable ofmotivating us to act, that is, to refrain from murder and do all we can to prevent murder, the latter active motivational moraljudgement must involve something over and above the former inert conclusion ofreason. I would agree with Stroud that Hume is right about this. Imagine a case ofa psychopath whose ability to argue and draw valid inferences is in perfectly good working order but whose motivational and emotional derangement is so severe that... (shrink)

Ineffability, method, and ontology, by G. Bergmann.--The glory and the misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein, by G. Bergmann.--Stenius on the Tractatus, by G. Bergmann.--Naming and saying, by W. Sellars.--The ontology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, by E. D. Klemke.--Material properties in the Tractatus, by H. Hochberg.--Wittgenstein's pantheism: a new light on the ontology of the Tractatus, by N. Garver.--Science and metaphysics: a Wittgensteinian interpretation, by H. Petrie.--Wittgenstein on private languages, by C. L. Hardin.--Wittgenstein on private language, by N. Garver.--Wittgenstein and private languages, by (...) W. Todd.--The private-language argument, by H.-N. Castañeda.--Wittgenstein on privacy, by J. W. Cook.--"Forms of life" in Wittgenstein's Philosophical investigations, by J. F. M. Hunter.--Privacy and language, by M. S. Gram.--On language games and forms of life, by F. Zabeeh.--Wittgenstein on meaning and use, by J. F. M. Hunter.--Wittgenstein on phenomenalism, skepticism, and criteria, by A. Oldenquist.--Tractarian reflections on saying and showing, by D. W. Stampe.--Wittgenstein and logical necessity, by B. Stroud.--Negation and generality, by H. Hochberg.--Facts, possibilities, and essences in the Tractatus, by H. Hochberg.--Arithmetic and propositional form in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, by H. Hochberg.--Selected bibliography (p. 543-546). (shrink)

This is a collection of essays by analytic philosophers who examine the sort of argument attributed to Kant in his refutation of Humes skepticism. This sort of argument is called transcendental and has the following structure: p; it would not be possible that p if we did not think that q; therefore we must think that q; therefore it is true that q.. If p stands for thought or experience, then this sort of argument is transcendental in that it argues (...) that something is required for thinking about or experiencing not merely particular things, but for thinking about or experiencing anything at all. The use of transcendental arguments by various figures in the history of philosophy is examined in these essays. However, the authors are primarily concerned with the use of such arguments by various recent analytic philosophers. The essays are written both by defenders of transcendental arguments, who are interested in refuting either Humean or Cartesian skepticism, and by detractors of these arguments. Barry Stroud is the prime example of the latter. Here the main debate concerns whether one can move from some undeniable facts about experience or the psychological realm to some facts about nonpsychological reality. Hence truth-directed transcendental arguments seem more controversial than belief-directed ones. Or again, critics of transcendental arguments very often focus on the legitimacy of drawing conclusions about the nature of reality from premises about the nature of thought. (shrink)

Naturalism is perhaps the most pervasive “-ism” in contemporary philosophy. Different variations of naturalism can be found in virtually all corners of theoretical and practical philosophy. Critics have rightfully noted that it is (a) often not clear what “naturalism” means exactly and, subsequently, (b) whether those who consider themselves naturalists in the same philosophical debate actually hold compatible, let alone the same, beliefs. -/- Among the different forms of naturalism that hold currency today, scientific naturalism seems to be the most (...) widespread and therefore articulated. It can be summarized as the ontological thesis that what exists are solely the entities posited by the natural sciences and the methodological thesis that philosophical inquiry should take the results of the natural sciences as authoritative. The paradigm of scientific naturalism has received a growing amount of critical attention from within and outside of analytic philosophy in the last few decades. The main thrust of a host of these critiques is to “soften” the claim of scientific naturalism by rejecting its reductionist or even eliminativist implications, yet retaining a commitment to naturalism under a new description. This has led to a proliferation of new forms of naturalism that seek to broaden the criteria which determine what belongs to the natural world, usually self-titled as a “liberal” or “relaxed” naturalism. Within the analytic tradition, naturalism has been thus critiqued since the 1990s by thinkers like Hornsby, Strawson, Nagel, Stroud, Putnam, McDowell or more recently Baker, De Caro, Macarthur, Beale & Kidd, Cahill & Raleigh. Such critiques are commonly motivated by Neo-Aristotelian and/or Wittgensteinian intuitions. From outside the analytic tradition, phenomenologists in the Husserlian tradition as well as thinkers in the Idealist tradition have been steadfastly critical of scientific naturalism as well, albeit for different reasons. However, these new proposals all have to contend with scientific naturalism and its more restrictive criteria for what counts as natural (although these are debated in their own right). (shrink)

There has recently been a focus on the question of statue removalism. This concerns what to do with public history statues that honour or otherwise celebrate ethically bad historical figures. The specific wrongs of these statues have been understood in terms of derogatory speech, inapt honours, or supporting bad ideologies. In this paper I understand these bad public history statues as history, and identify a distinctive class of public history-specific wrongs. Specifically, public history plays an important identity-shaping role, and bad (...) public history can commit specifically ontic injustice. Understanding bad public history in terms of ontic injustice helps understand not just to address bad public history statues, but also understand the value of public history more broadly. (shrink)